Transferable Traits
A: Proof that the Apple Way is a transferable trait.
Q: What is Former Apple SVP Ron Johnson’s new JCP Sunday circular?
- Let the product do the talking
- Less is more
- Spend more timing looking ahead than behind
- Know when to place a big bet, and then go all in.
"[Apple is] going to continue to make the best products in the world that delight our customers and make our employees incredibly proud of what they do."
- Tim Cook in his first email to Apple employees as Apple’s new CEO sent August 25, 2011
"The path [Sony] must take is clear: to drive the growth of our core electronics businesses - primarily digital imaging, smart mobile and game; to turn around the television business; and to accelerate the innovation that enables us to create new business domains."
- Kazuo Hirai in response to being appointed Sony’s new President and CEO on February 1, 2012
Apple: {best, world, delight, proud} vs. Sony: {growth, businesses, accelerate, domains}
Not everyone copies Apple.
Apple’s 1Q12 earnings report will boil down to two simple data points: iPhone and iPad sales. Guidance will take a back seat, as will margin expectations and management commentary. The market wants confirmation that iPhone and iPad demand is robust, especially after Apple’s disappointing 4Q11.
The magic numbers will be 31 and 13. If Apple sold more than 31 million iPhones and 13 million iPads, Apple will have met expectations (sky-high for iPhone and lukewarm for iPad). Whisper numbers (the numbers that analysts secretly discuss) probably stand somewhere near 34 million iPhones and 15 million iPads, but missing whisper numbers usually won’t lead to negative EPS estimate revisions.
In an attempt to put the last few weeks of heightened iPhone 1Q12 expectations (and reduced iPad expectations) within context, and using my 1Q12 estimates published on November 18, 2011, I would put 27 million iPhones and 12 million iPads as the minimal bar Apple has to jump over in order to avoid significant negative EPS revisions and price target cuts.
Research in Motion (RIMM) is in a death spiral. Consumers are moving away from the platform in droves, Blackberries have lost the “cool” factor, and RIMM management is unable to control Wall Street expectations. RIMM’s primary problem is incompetent management.
At first, it is difficult to believe that such a large company (at least in the eyes of Canada) could possibly have inept management. People assume if you are CEO of a company, you know what you are doing. How else would you get to the top position of a multi-billion dollar company?
Unfortunately, RIMM management is indeed inept and incompetent. RIMM understands its main problem; no one wants the current Blackberry phone line-up. Don’t be fooled by RIMM sales figures still in the millions of units. Quarterly sales are declining in absolute terms (in a market that is booming). A bad sign to say the least. However, RIMM doesn’t know the solution to its problem. According to RIMM, the solution is introducing new Blackberries. Take the Blackberry that everyone loved, and just give it incremental updates or speed bumps. Problem solved. You can see how this solution is inadequate and simply wrong. According to management, RIMM is facing hard times because Blackberry updates are delayed (It’s hard to recall a moment when RIMM management actually admitted things aren’t going well - a tell-tale sign that incompetency is running the show). Management is living in a fairy tale where iOS and Android aren’t the problem. Some may say that RIMM knows it has no viable solution to compete against iOS and Android. If true, I don’t see how the current management team and Board are still working for RIMM shareholders. It speaks volumes that not even activist shareholders want to get involved in RIMM…yet.
Making matters worse, RIMM is now unable to push out new Blackberries until the end of 2012. I assume RIMM employees are still going into the office each day and doing something. The question is what exactly are they doing?
How did RIMM get in this position? I suspect the timeline went something like this:
1) iPhone is introduced. 2007.
RIMM laughs it off and is confident that RIMM sales won’t be impacted. iPhone doesn’t have a physical keyboard. Who would want that?
2) Significant iPhone updates are introduced, including the app store. Android begins to take off (largely resembling iOS - apps and touch screens). 2008 and Early 2009
RIMM sales are still growing and RIMM’s stock price hits an all-time high in the middle of 2008. The subsequent global financial crisis hits RIMM’s stock price (along with every other company) masking some of the growing issues around the company.
3) iPhone and Android are exploding. Middle to Late 2009.
Up to this point, I really don’t think RIMM was too concerned with its prospects. Consumers (enterprise) were still addicted to Blackberries and its email capabilities and physical keyboards. Fundamental holes are forming though. ASPs are beginning to fall and RIMM is starting to lose grip of the high-end market. Channel fill is at all-time highs. Developed country growth is no longer increasing. Management’s solution is to focus on emerging markets. Problem solved.
4) iPhone 4. 2010.
The game has changed - again. RIMM has to see signs that things are not going well. iPhone blows past RIMM in sales. RIMM introduces its flawed Playbook. RIMM’s plan for phones? Updated Blackberries, of course. Research and development is caught flat-footed and asleep. RIMM has little to nothing in terms of alternatives beyond its signature Blackberry keyboards.
5) Current Day.
Playbook is a disaster. RIMM is in a death spiral. Incremental updates are now in disarray. iPhone and Android are eating up RIMM’s marketshare.
RIMM will make a classic business school case study. RIMM was a company that became a powerhouse for doing one thing really well (email) at a time when the smartphone market was a disaster and phones really weren’t too smart. Apple introduced the iPhone and everything changed. Even though many of RIMM’s metrics appeared healthy (subscriber growth, increasing sales) for a number of quarters post-iPhone, tumors were forming. Consumers were offered a better alternative and RIMM was unable to respond due to their inability (or lack of desire) to move beyond its core competency and lead the market into new innovation.
RIMM now faces a number of severe and multifaceted problems that could very well lead to the end of the company. I don’t think RIMM R&D is capable of innovating. RIMM has already lost the cool factor and chances are slim they will ever get it back. RIMM management seemingly never planned for the product after Blackberry. I don’t think its a stretch to think of it as Apple never planning for the day after the iPod. Sounds incomprehensible. Should companies that make such fatal errors, throwing innovation aside to instead milk current successes, deserve to survive? Even if RIMM does introduce a good phone in the future, consumers won’t care. If one thing is clear in consumer technology, it’s that momentum can be your friend (or in RIMM’s case, your enemy).
I expect iPad and iPhone to represent nearly 70% of Apple’s quarterly revenue. My projected revenue is 38% higher than any previous quarter (closest was $28.6 billion revenue reported in 3Q11).
Apple’s margin in 2011 ranged from 38.5% to 41.7%. A higher iPhone mix during 1Q12 (including 3GS and 4 models) should benefit overall GM with component pricing remaining largely unchanged from previous quarters.
I expect Apple to report 63% yoy earnings growth.
Product Unit Sales and Commentary
Mac experienced 22% yoy growth in 2011 (34% growth in portables and 1% in desktops) and I expect similar growth during 1Q12 as consumers flock to the MacBook Air. Apple will continue to take market share from Windows (early stages of 5-10+ year trend). As the PC market struggles to grow (thanks in part to the proliferation of smartphones and iPad), I view long-term Mac growth near 10% as very respectable.
iPad supply/demand returned to equilibrium during 4Q11 with Apple reporting an average weekly sales rate of 925,000 iPads. My 14.7 million iPad estimate assumes an average 1.1 million iPad weekly (13 weeks) sales rate (higher than 4Q11 due primarily to holiday shopping). I am not forecasting any significant change to the iPad channel. While there have been many rumors and reports indicating softening iPad demand, I think some of that is the reduction of overly optimistic iPad expectations towards a more conservative consensus expectation. I think iPad will remain a top holiday gift. My 100% yoy growth does contain some conservatism when compared to 334% yoy iPad growth reported in 2011.
Continued strong iPod touch sales will partially offset the continued decline in Apple’s other iPod models. Apple refreshed the iPod line-up in 4Q11 and iPods do make great stocking stuffers, so my 15% yoy decline is slightly higher than the 20% and 27% yoy declines registered in 3Q11 and 4Q11, respectively.
iPhone 4S sales are off to a fast start with 4 million devices sold during opening weekend, a 1-2 week backlog on Apple’s online store (my iPhone 4S ordered from Apple took 15 days to arrive), and continued extended shipping waits at mobile carriers. It is clear that iPhone 4S supply/demand is not in equilibrium. iPhone 3GS (and iPhone 4) price reductions should also benefit 1Q12 sales. Apple’s largest iPhone quarter prior to 1Q12 was 20.3 million sold during 3Q11 (average of 1.7 million per week). My 28.4 million estimate reflects an average 2.2 million per week sales rate, but I admit that sales will be limited to Apple’s iPhone production levels. Another way to conceptualize my estimate: I am assuming 4 million iPhone 4S devices sold during opening weekend and then a subsequent 2 million units sold each following week (not out of the question given continued stockouts and the impact from 3GS and 4 models).
Questions can be addressed to me through twitter.
